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INTRODUCTION
The "shelf-life" of most social science is depressingly short. The
community rarely pays attention to articles that are more than a few years old
because most theories, findings or techniques are only relevant for a short
while-if at all. There are rare exceptions, of course: path-breaking pieces
whose status as classics warrants the continued attention of scholars decades
after they were published. But it is even more rare to find a fifty year old
article that: (a) seems to have been almost completely forgotten; (b) was
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intellectually so novel that it reads like an introduction to many of the major
trends of the next fifty years; and (c) speaks directly and cogently to a policy
issue of immense current importance. War Damage Insurance,' published by
Jack Hirshleifer in 1953, is precisely such an article, and I am thrilled to be
able to bring it to the attention of those modem readers who (like me, until a
few weeks ago) do not know of its existence.
In this brief comment, I will approach the article in two ways: first, I want
to situate the piece in the context of the fifty years of economic thinking that
followed it. I will argue that the article foreshadows many of the most
important insights in economics between 1950 and today. For instance,
economists now take concepts of moral hazard and adverse selection for
granted in analyzing insurance markets-and virtually every other kind of
market as well. Hirshleifer's 1953 article is one of the earliest serious
treatments of these ideas. That is more than enough for any paper, but the
article anticipates other important intellectual developments as well, including
the analysis of "Public Choice" or imperfections in governmental policy-
making. The only puzzle is why this article has not achieved the classic status
it deserves. I briefly consider this question.
My second goal is to consider the substantive content of Hirshleifer's
analysis in the aftermath of the economic policy problems posed by the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Here, I will claim that much of the
article is as relevant today as it was fifty years ago, although I will also point
out some qualifications and implementation problems that are likely to present
themselves.
I. A VERY BRIEF OVERVIEW
The article begins by noting while that the threat of (limited) nuclear
attack can be countered by various military means, there are also precautions
that civilians can take that will lessen the damage caused by an attack if one
does occur.2 (These include mitigation efforts such as building stronger
buildings, dispersing development outside of large cities that are especially
vulnerable to attack, installing better fire-prevention systems, and so on). The
concern of the article is to devise a system that will provide the proper
incentives for civilian precautions or mitigation efforts.3 Almost all of what
Hirshleifer had to say about the threat of limited nuclear attack fifty years ago
1. Jack Hirshleifer, War Damage Insurance, 35 REV. ECON. STAT. 144 (1953), 9 CONN.
INS. L. J. 1 (2002).
2. Id. at 144, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. at 1.
3. Id.
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is relevant to the threat of terrorist attack today, yet another way in which the
article is eerily au courant.
Hirshleifer begins by noting that if there were an attack on one or two
cities, the political system would inevitably respond by providing substantial
aid for the rebuilding of the affected areas.4 Knowing this response, forward-
looking decision-makers will alter their behavior accordingly. They will take
fewer precautions---exercise less "care"--than they would in the absence of a
predicted bailout because precautions are costly and they know that much of
their losses will be recouped from the government, regardless of the level of
precautions they take.' In other words, when they know that compensation
will be forthcoming in the event of an attack, builders will have less reason to
locate outside of large cities, or to install fire-prevention equipment, because
these steps are all costly and yield no real benefit, since the government will
compensate them for any losses they sustain. As a result, buildings will be
more clustered together, and less structurally sound, than would be optimal.
To solve the problem of inadequate incentives to take care, Hirshleifer
proposes a system of government-provided war damage insurance, in which
insureds pay premiums that reflect their actual risk of loss, and are
compensated-in the event of loss--out of the premiums collected.6 Under
this system, buildings located in large cities that are the most likely targets of
attack (or those built without substantial fire-prevention infrastructure) would
be charged higher insurance premiums, which act as both an incentive and a
signal. Lower rates in safer areas would give decision-makers a reason, at
least at the margin, to locate away from large cities-lower insurance costs
outside of major metropolitan areas. Put another way, premium differentials
would signal which actions are appropriate, because interested parties could
compare premiums for various designs or locations, and thereby obtain an
4. Id. at 144, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. at 1-2.
5. As we will see, this is a standard moral hazard problem that arises from the
incompatibility of insurance and incentives. Of course, some losses will not be "insured" by a
government bailout, and firms will still have an incentive to take precautions that reduce such
losses. However, the overall incentives to take care are reduced by a bailout program that
eliminates any part of the total cost of an attack. In other words, if a firm expects to have
uninsured losses to personnel of one hundred and uninsured losses to property of seventy-five,
it will have more reason to take more precautions than if it expects only the former, with the
latter being covered by the government.
6. Hirshleifer, supra note 1, at 147-52, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. at 7-15. The design of the
system is given considerable attention, and I will discuss it in detail below.
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implicit estimate of the hazards involved in whatever choice they are
considering.7
II. LOOKING BACKWARD
Hirshleifer's piece was far ahead of its time. Reading it today, one can see
that it anticipated many of the most important and interesting results in
economics over the next fifty years, many almost as an aside.
A. Public Choice
Consider first the issue of Public Choice or endogenous policy-making.
At mid-century, most economists believed that the appropriate role of
government was to correct various forms of market failures, which classically
included externalities (e.g., pollution), failures of competition (monopoly), or
the provision of public goods that markets would under-produce (e.g, national
defense). The paradigm for doing economics was relatively simple: (1)
identify a market failure (pollution); (2) show how governmental intervention
could solve the problem (by taxing or regulating pollution); and (3) go home
satisfied with a day's work well done.
Economists have since come to realize, however, that government may not
act as a benign and omniscient social planner-that it may not do exactly what
we would like it to do. Instead, policy will often reflect the political agendas
of those in charge, rather than economists' efficiency-minded solutions. As
such, it may not solve the problems to which it is ostensibly addressed, and
will sometimes create new inefficiencies. This insight has blossomed into a
whole sub-field of economics-Public Choice-and has been widely
influential.8
Hirshleifer makes the Public Choice point almost offhandedly. The article
begins with the insight that providing compensation after the occurrence of a
7. See Goran Skogh, The Transaction Cost Theory of Insurance: Contracting
Impediments and Cost, 56 J. RISK & INs. 726 (1989). Skogh notes that large corporations are
often bigger and more diversified than the insurers to whom they sell risks. Their demand for
insurance is thus not plausibly based on risk-transfer. Instead, insurance is desired because of
the specialized loss-control services that come with it, and because premiums provide
information on avoidance costs. Because their job is to monitor and price risks, insurance
companies are ideally positioned to acquire and disseminate this information.
8. The pioneering work in economics is George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971). Other early contribution in this genre include Gary S.
Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor Political Influence, 98 Q. J.
ECoN. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory ofRegulation, 19 J. L. &
EcoN. 211 (1976); Richard Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. 22 (1971).
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disaster is so politically attractive that the government will invariably find it
impossible to resist. As Hirshleifer puts it, "in the absence of an insurance
program, it will be politically impossible for the government not to
compensate for damage[since] .. . the inequity of the fortuitous distribution of
losses is so generally recognized . . . ,9 Hence, although a policy of no
compensation for war damages or terrorism would provide the proper
incentives for care or mitigation,'I such a "no compensation" policy is not
feasible because policy-makers always find it in their interests to provide
compensation." Politics, not economic theory, drives policy outcomes.
Suppose, however, that policy makers were more interested in efficiency
and incentives than Hirshleifer gives them credit for. Imagine that the federal
government, aware of the perverse incentives created by compensating victims
of terrorist attacks, went so far as to announce that it will not pay any
compensation in the event of a future attack. Even so, the Public Choice
problem is likely to reassert itself. The reason is an application of a classic
problem first explicitly analyzed by Thomas Schelling, that of
9. Hirshleifer, supra note 1, at 14647, 9 CONN. INs. L. J. at 6. Hirshleifer has long been
interested in the limits of economic analysis in policy-making, and the important role of
"political" factors. In a famous assessment of water policy, he concluded that policy makers
had completely ignored the advice of economists and instead embarked on grossly inefficient
schemes for pricing and allocating water when much better alternatives were available. He
ended the article by suggesting that "the agenda for economists, at this point, should place
lower priority upon the further refinement of advice for those efficient and selfless
administrators who may exist in never-never land. Rather, it should focus on devising
institutions whereby fallible and imperfect administrators may be forced to learn from error."
Jack Hirshleifer & J. W. Milliman, Urban Water Supply: A Second Look, 57 AMER. ECON. REV.
169, 178 (1967).
10. This point foreshadows an important insight in the economics of negligence law: in a
world where the only productive precautions can be taken by victims, optimal care requires a
rule of no-liability. The reason is that when victims face the full costs of an accident, they will
necessarily reap the full benefits of every dollar they spend on prevention or mitigation, and
will thus have an incentive to spend up to the point where the marginal dollar of precaution just
covers its expected savings in accident costs. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW
& ECONOMIcs 272-75 (2d ed., 1997).
11. Hirshleifer's recommendations are also an interesting example, again (slightly) ahead
of its time, of so-called "second-best theory," a general equilibrium analysis of policy choices
when the government is not able to choose the optimal policy instrument. See Richard G.
Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second-Best, 24 REv. ECON. STuD. 11
(1956). Here, the first-best policy might be to refuse compensation to everyone, but that
strategy is ruled out by the political context; in the presence of such constraints on government
behavior, insurance is second-best.
2002]
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"commitment."' 2 This problem occurs whenever long-run and short-run
interests diverge and there is no way to bind one's self now to take the optimal
policy in the future.
Consider the policy of paying ransom to hostage-takers. Governments
will always find it in their interest to declare resolutely that they will not pay
ransom. It is of course the right thing to say, because if kidnappers are certain
that no ransom will be paid, they will not find it attractive to take hostages in
the first place. The problem is that once hostages are taken, everyone knows
that the government's short-run interests lie in not letting its citizens languish
in captivity: it is simply too damaging politically, and the rewards for freeing
the hostages are too great, for any government to ignore. 13 Hence, even if the
government initially promises not to pay ransom, its promise is not credible
because when the future ultimately comes around, it will not be in its interest
to keep its promise. Knowing all this, kidnappers will see through the promise
not to pay ransom, and hostages will continue to be taken.
Schelling's analysis highlighted the strategic value of "hands-tying" or
commitment devices. 14 In the hostage situation, for example, the President
might state explicitly that if he were ever found to have negotiated with
terrorists, he would immediately resign from office. Hearing this, kidnappers
might then believe that the President would indeed refuse to negotiate with
them, since the personal cost of his doing so would be too high. This kind of
self-imposed constraint on future behavior can, as Schelling saw, be used to
sustain promises that are otherwise not credible.
While Schelling should be credited for naming and analyzing this kind of
commitment problem, Hirshleifer deserves recognition for implicitly
suggesting that governmental provision of insurance can serve as a kind of
12. THOMAS C. SCHELLNG, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). Schelling's book has
achieved classic status-its ideas are still discussed today, even though it was published more
than forty years ago. Interestingly, Hirshleifer has himself explicitly addressed these issues in
recent work. See Jack Hirshleifer, Game-Theoretic Interpretations of Commitment, Ch. 4., in
RANDOLPH M. NESSE, EVOLUTION AND THE CAPACITY FOR COMMITMENT (2001).
13. This is precisely the behavior of President Reagan in the so-called Iran-Contra affair:
while denying that he was negotiating for the release of the American hostages held in Iran, the
administration was in fact making a deal for their release. See, e.g., The Iran-Contra Report;
Key Sections of the Document: The Making ofa Political Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1987, at
A14.
14. The myth of Ulysses, who wanted to hear the Sirens' deadly song, is a paradigmatic
example of strategic self-constraint. Jon Elster, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1984). Ulysses had his crew tie him to the mast, plugged up
their ears with wax, and sailed past the Sirens' cave. Only by thus binding himself and his
men, could Ulysses listen to the Sirens' song without perishing.
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commitment or hands-tying device that could reduce the problem of
suboptimal policy choice. 5 By announcing a program of premium-based
insurance, the government effectively increases the cost of paying gratuitous
compensation, making a promise not to do so more credible than it would
otherwise be. The rationale seems to be that insurance inherently offers a link
between compensation and premiums: only those who have paid for their
insurance have a legitimate claim to receive compensation. Thus,
governmental provision of insurance could act as check on the temptation to
hand out compensation indiscriminately and at no cost to its recipients.16
In sum, Hirshleifer not only recognized early on that there are such
things as predictable policy failures, but also saw that an insurance program
can be used to overcome them by committing the government not to do the
wrong thing when the time comes.
B. Moral Hazard
Another important theme in Hirshleifer's article is moral hazard, which
can be crudely described as the tendency of insureds to reduce their own
precautions as more of their losses are covered by insurance. Moral hazard is
now an essential part of the game-theoretic or analytical toolkit of economists;
it is used to understand any situation in which one party can take actions that
are unobserved by another and which affect the payoffs to both. Insurance
markets are only one example, since this kind of asymmetric information is
present in virtually every strategic interaction. 7 Indeed, it is hard to overstate
15. See Hirschleifer, supra note 1.
16. Although Hirshleifer does not explore this issue in any detail, we might ask why this
should be so. The "discipline" provided by insurance-its role as a commitment device to
check excessively generous compensation-seems to have both a political and moral
dimension. Politically, it is easier to deny compensation for the uninsured if there are many
who have purchased their insurance and could be mobilized to oppose the free provision of
something they had to pay for. But the prophylactic effect of insurance also has a moral aspect:
it seems less as inequitable or wrong to deny compensation to a victim who had a chance to
purchase insurance, but turned it down, as it does to leave someone to suffer the random bad
luck of being a victim of an enemy attack when no insurance was available. The former can be
said to have assumed the risk of the misfortune in a way that the latter cannot, and seem to have
less claim to our sympathies as a result.
17. The canonical reference is Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty andthe Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 AMER. ECON. REv. 941 (1963). Arrow stresses the importance of the "moral"
dimension to moral hazard in his reply to Professors Pauly's comment on this article. See The
Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 537 (1968). See also
Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV. 237 (1996), which surveys
the intellectual history of this term.
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the importance of moral hazard in contemporary economic theory-it has
become one of the central concerns in the discipline.
Although he does not mention it by name, Hirshleifer clearly recognizes
that moral hazard is likely to occur when (everyone believes that) the
government will compensate all war damages. Why bother to reinforce your
building or move your business to a less desirable location if the government
will fully compensate you for your losses in the event of war? It is precisely
this notion that leads Hirshleifer to conclude that "simple compensation
programs... tend actually to discourage private actions which would reduce
vulnerability, thereby increasing the overall national risk."' 8 Although this
may not be the first serious discussion of the incentive effects of insurance, it
does appear to be one of the earliest treatments of this issue in mainstream
economics.
Economists have mixed views about insurance. On the one hand,
insurance is welfare-enhancing because most people are usually risk-averse.
This means they prefer to reallocate wealth from "no accident" states of the
world (where wealth is high and the marginal utility of wealth is low) to those
states where an accident does occur, wealth is diminished, and the marginal
utility of wealth is therefore higher.' 9 Insurance is nothing more than a
mechanism for "shipping" wealth from good times (when the marginal dollar
is worth relatively less) to bad times (when it is worth relatively more).
On the other hand, the provision of insurance will rarely leave the
behavior of the insured unaffected. The typical conclusion of economists is
that insurance is the enemy of incentives. Full insurance, by definition,
implies that the insured suffers no risk of bad consequences, and therefore has
no reason to undertake costly precautions that lower the probability (or cost)
of the adverse event being insured against.20
Hirshleifer's paper offers a novel twist on this insight, suggesting that
insurance can support or reinforce incentives, at least when the choice is
between appropriately-priced fee-based insurance and free compensation. 2'
18. Hirshleifer, supra note 1, at 146, 9 CONN. INS. L. J. at 5 (emphasis in original).
19. Hirshleifer pioneered this vocabulary for analyzing insurance. See J. Hirshleifer,
Investment Decision under Uncertainty: Applications of the State-Preference Approach, 80 Q.
J. ECON. 252 (1966).
20. An extreme version of this insight is illustrated by the joke about two Vermont
farmers. The first tells the other: "I just bought fiab and flood insurance on my bahn." The
second pauses, and then says, "I understand about the fiah, but how do ya' staht a flood?"
21. Economists are famous for believing that nothing is ever really free. Compensation for
victims of terrorist attacks has to come from somewhere, and assuming it is financed out of tax
revenues, there are significant distortionary effects to be reckoned with. Indeed, the
[Vol. 9:1
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C. Adverse Selection
Like moral hazard, adverse selection is another concept originally
borrowed from the insurance literature which has had a profound influence on
mainstream economics, especially in game-theoretic analysis of strategic
interactions.22 The basic idea is that adverse selection is likely to occur
whenever:
(a) one party (A) offers to transact with another (B), and
B can choose to accept or reject A's offer;
(b) B has information about the value of the transaction
to A that A does not have; and
(c) B is most likely to accept A's offer when B's
information is "bad" (i.e., adverse) to A.
For example, imagine a stylized world in which there are only two kinds of
used cars, "good" (worth 100 to the seller and 110 to the buyer) and "lemons"
(worth 20 to the seller and 22 to the buyer), each of which comprise half of the
total. Owner/sellers know the true quality of their car, but buyers do not, and
cannot verify the quality. The average car is worth 66 to the buyer; but at a
price of 66, the only cars that owners will be willing to part with are the
lemons. At any price above 100, all cars will be put on the market, but of
course buyers are guaranteed to lose-out on average, since they will be
spending 100 for something with an average value of 66. Knowing all this,
buyers will never agree to offer more than 22, and thus, the only cars that can
be sold are the lemons. This is true even though each car is worth 10 percent
more to a buyer than to its owner. Bad cars have driven good cars out of the
market.23 I was able to find only twelve cursory mentions of the phrase
"adverse selection" in the economics literature before 1953, none of which
contained anything like a sustained analysis of the problem. Hirshleifer's
discussion of adverse selection in the market for war damages insurance is
thus a candidate for the first significant treatment of this topic in the
conventional wisdom is that the true economic cost of raising one dollar in tax revenues is
roughly thirty cents. I ignore these considerations in the rest of the paper.
22. The concept is now deeply entrenched in economic analysis. The 2001 Nobel prize
shared by George Akerlof was awarded largely on the basis of his article, The Marketfor
'Lemons:' Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. EcON. 488 (1970), which
offered the first formal model of adverse selection.
23. This is a simplified version of Akerlof's story. Akerlof, supra note 22, at 489-90. Of
course, we can expect that institutions will develop to handle this kind of problem, including
warranties by sellers, dealers with a reputational interest in selling high-quality cars, inspection
services, and so on. Nevertheless, the example is compelling on its own terms.
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economics literature. Even if it did nothing else, this would be quite an
achievement for any article!
Why would adverse selection be an issue in war damages insurance?
Hirshleifer gives three reasons. First, when participation in the insurance pool
is voluntary, there will be a "tendency of poor risks to take out insurance and
good risks to self-insure .... 24 This in turn would make it more difficult to
establish appropriate premiums, since the actuarially fair (break-even) rate for
those who sign up for insurance will necessarily be higher (but by an unknown
amount) than for the population as whole.
This is (by now) a standard analysis of adverse selection in insurance
markets, and while it is substantially ahead of its time, I find Hirshleifer's
second reason to be even more interesting. He argues that mandatory
"universal coverage (not achievable under a voluntary plan) would entirely
eliminate the problem of demands for compensation sure to arise after
bombing on behalf of those who have failed to take out insurance.,
25
Once again, we have an intriguing mix of political economy and moral
theory. It is not just that universal coverage prevents the good risks from
dropping out of the pool ex ante, as in the standard adverse selection story.
Rather, Hirshleifer recognizes that victims of substantial random catastrophes
have an ethical claim on the rest of us for compensation, so that there can also
be ex post adverse selection (with negative incentives for future behavior).
Thus, even if we want to deny compensation to those who are injured on
efficiency grounds, we find it (appropriately) difficult or impossible to do so
because we do not wish to turn our backs on people who have been injured in
this way.
Finally, there is a potential problem of adverse selection with respect to
time, which could occur because when participation is voluntary, "people will
be tempted to speculate on the probability of war. That is to say, they may not
take out insurance until the international situation becomes very threatening..
.,26 This is an unusual type of adverse selection, which to my knowledge is
not widely discussed in the literature. Hirshleifer cleverly proposes several
techniques for resolving this problem, including time-varying insurance
premiums and a mandatory waiting period of six to twelve months between
the time insurance is purchased and the time when it would take effect.
I find it interesting that, in spite of his perceptive analysis of the adverse
selection problems that would plague voluntary war damage insurance,
24. Hirshleifer, supra note 1, at 147, 9 CONN. INS. L. J. at 7.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 151,9CoNN. INS. L. J. at 13.
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Hirshleifer seems to prefer a voluntary plan to compulsory insurance. At least
he assumes in the remainder of the article that participation will be voluntary.
It is hard to know whether this reflects an actual commitment on his part to
freedom of contract (absence of coercion), or whether he is simply making a
kind of afortiori argument: war damage insurance is such a good idea that it
can succeed even if we choose a method of implementation that is subject to
seriously adverse selection problems.
D. Why Isn't This Article a Classic?
I haven't done justice to all of the article's provocative ideas. For
example, Hirshleifer suggests, "[w]ithout extended argument," that the
objective of war damages insurance should be
to restore the relative position of those who lose property by
the bombing so that they are no worse off than the nation as a
whole. Since the bombing will reduce the real national wealth,
the restoration of the absolute position of those who lose
property would mean an actual gain for them relative to the
rest of the community. It follows.., that ... if, for example,
10 percent of the national wealth is destroyed in the bombing,
the real value of the compensation should be at the rate of 90
percent of the real value of the loss. 2
7
This is a novel and interesting idea at many levels. It is now standard to think
about co-insurance requirements as a deterrent to moral hazard: they require
the insured to keep part of the risk of loss, and thus offer at least some
incentive for him to take care. That a portion of an insured's loss that would
be uncompensated under Hirshleifer's fairness criterion might therefore also
have a desirable incentive effect.28
Given all this, I am puzzled that the article does not seem to have the
reputation it deserves. Maybe I am just idiosyncratic. But I suspect the
answer is two-fold. First, although it draws on and develops many deep and
important ideas, the article does so in order to further the analysis of a real
policy problem. Hence, it might have been easy to overlook its insights
because they are so clearly in the service of the problem at issue, and are not
trumpeted or even highlighted in any way. Moreover, there is no formal
27. Id. at 152, 9 Co~NN. INS. L. J. at 15.
28. Moreover, the emphasis on the relative economic position of those who suffer losses
resonates with all kinds of debates in political theory, as well as with a growing literature in
economics on the importance of relative standing and relative preferences. See, e.g., ROBERT
FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HuMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985).
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model deployed-the insights are developed entirely verbally. And
economists tend to place a high value on formalism, sometimes almost as an
end in itself.
A second explanation is that the topic of how to mitigate the effects of
bombing (either from nuclear war or terrorism) is a rather morbid one, as we
now know all to well. Even economists probably preferred not to think about
the loss of major cities to a nuclear attack, just as most of us now prefer not to
dwell on the risks of terrorism. I suspect the article's reputation may therefore
have suffered because of its unpleasant subject matter.
Pathbreaking as it was, I think the article suffers from another problem, at
least in the eyes of non-economists. Viewing compensation for war damages,
or damages from terrorism, as a purely economic problem seems to me to miss
something important about the way most people think about the issue. The
reason is that collectivizing the harms from war damages by compensating
victims out of governmental revenues has "expressive" as well as economic
consequences. 29  In other words, voluntarily compensating victims by
spreading or "socializing" the risk says something about us as a country, as a
culture, and as a foe of whoever is attacking us. What it says is that the
country is united, that an attack on one is an attack on all, and that we will
willingly share the harms from any attack, even though many of us are
unaffected in any direct or material sense.
This sense of unity is an important thing to convey, for many reasons.
Most obviously, it is important to say because it is true, as the hundreds of
impromptu shrines and memorials around New York City in the wake of
September 1 lth attest: people do care about each other. The message may
also have important strategic consequences: if anyone thinks they can blow up
New York and that Californians or Iowans will not care, the willingness of
Californians and Iowans to compensate victims is proof that this is not true. If
instead of voluntarily-provided compensation, we substitute a kind of pay-as-
you-go insurance system, in which the victims only get out what they have (in
expected value terms) already put in through their premiums, the expressive
element of compensation is now largely missing. This may be a serious
drawback, both from an expressive and strategic perspective.
III. LOOKING FORWARD
Instead of looking backward at the last fifty years of economics, I now
want to address the issue of whether War Damage Insurance remains a useful
29. Thanks to Gideon Parchomovsky for this significant insight.
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piece of public policy analysis in today's environment---one in which the
United States is once again under threat of attack, this time from terrorists. I
conclude that it does, with some caveats.
A. Public Choice and Compensation
As noted earlier, a key assumption underlying Hirshleifer's argument for
the government's provision of insurance against property loss due to war (or
terrorism) is that in the absence of such insurance, the political system will
nevertheless find it impossible to avoid providing significant compensation to
owners of damaged property. 30 Fully-covered insureds will then have
improper incentives to take 'are (moral hazard), especially if their coverage is
provided for free. One benefit of aformal fee-based insurance scheme is thus
that it can forestall the provision of gratuitous compensation that would distort
or eliminate any incentives to mitigate the harms from terrorism.
The case for government-provided insurance is therefore most convincing
when the political system will inevitably decide to compensate a substantial
fraction of all losses-the greater is coverage, the smaller are incentives to
undertake mitigation. Hirshleifer implicitly makes the assumption that the
politically-motivated "loss-replacement rate" will be close to 100 percent.3'
Fortunately, there was never a nuclear attack on the United States that would
have put the governmental response to the test.
But the recent terrorist attacks do provide a test of Hirshleifer's "Public
Choice" assumption about governmental behavior. We should thus look at the
governmental compensation provided in response to the September 1 th
attacks, and ask how generous it actually was. If it replaced only a small
fraction of the property losses, the case for fee-based insurance as a device
that will commit the government not to hand out gratuitous benefits after an
attack seems less compelling.
What do we know about the governmental response? The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimated that Congress authorized about $40 billion of
additional emergency supplemental appropriations in the immediate aftermath
of the attacks.32 Of this amount, CBO suggests that roughly $10.2 billion will
30. Hirschleifer, supra note 2, at 149, 9 CONN. INS. L. J. at 10.
31. Hirschleifer, supra note 2, at 146 n.6, 9 CONN. INS. L. J. at 6 n.6.
32. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2003-
2012, Chapter 7, Box 7-2 (Jan. 2002) [hereinafter OUTLOOK]. The $40 billion comes from the
2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States (Pub. L. No. 107-38) and the Department of Defense and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks
on the United States Act, 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-17).
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go to New York City, "providing both support to business and individuals and
support to state and local governments., 33 Aid to victims' families could add
another $6 billion to this amount over nine years.34
It is very difficult to know how much of this money can or will be used to
compensate for (potentially) insurable property losses, as opposed to other
economic losses (e.g., from disruptions to business activity), or as pure
compensation to families of victims. But suppose we assume, generously, that
the entire $10 billion will be paid to compensate property losses. We might
then crudely estimate the total property losses from the attacks at $20 billion.35
By this rough estimate, governmental compensation seems to have replaced
only about one-half of the property losses. The one-half figure is probably too
high, since not all of the governmental aid will likely compensate property
losses, and these losses are likely to be larger than $20 billion.36
Imagine now that you are a private decision-maker, considering what kind
of precautions to take against terrorism. For this stylized example, we will
collapse all of your precaution decision to one variable-where to locate your
new office building-although there are of course many other margins on
which precautions can be taken. On the one hand, you expect that losses from
terrorism are more likely to occur if you locate in New York than in, say,
Dubuque. On the other, you figure that if a terrorist threat does indeed
materialize, you can count on the federal government to pick up some fraction
p of your losses, which we can term the replacement rate. If (P were equal to
one, all losses would be covered, and you would have no reason to care about
them at all-this is the extreme version of moral hazard. But for a
33. OUTLOOK, supra note 32 at 118.
34. Id.
35. Immediately after the attacks, the Global Disaster Information Network, on the basis of
a sophisticated actuarial model of New York City property values, estimated that the property
losses from the attacks would be in the range of"$7 to $11 billion, including building, contents,
and direct business interruption losses generally associated with property claims.... [This
excludes] contingent business interruption, aviation, casualty, and liability losses for this
disaster." World Trade Center Disaster, RMS Special Report (Sept. 18, 2001), at
http://www.gdin-intemational.org/wg/wtc.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2002). More recently, the
ISO estimated that insured property losses from the attack stood at $16.6 billion as of March
11,2002. See http://www.iso.com/studiesanalyses/study018.html (last visited Nov. 9,2002).
36. On the other hand, I have ignored funds provided by state agencies and by private
entities; I suspect that most of these funds were not designated to replace lost property,
however.
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replacement rate of 1/2, you will absorb 50 cents of each dollar of loss, what
amounts to a fifty percent coinsurance rate.37
Table one lays out a stylized example that develops this comparison,
assuming arbitrarily that the probability of attack is 10 percent in New York
and 6 percent in Dubuque. Suppose there is no governmental compensation,
(and no insurance at all), so p = 0, as in column one. Expected wealth is 4.4
percent higher if Dubuque is chosen over New York since the probability of
attack is lower in Iowa. If instead the government were to replace 50 percent
of each dollar lost, as in column two, Dubuque would still dominate New
York, but its relative advantage shrinks by more than half, to only 2.1
percent.38
Of course, this example does not prove that everyone should move from
New York to Dubuque. What it shows is that in a world in which no
compensation is forthcoming, those for whom the benefits of staying in New
York apart from the risk of attack are less than four should (and will) move;
the threshold for staying falls to two when the government compensates half
of all losses. Hence, someone at the margin (for whom the benefits of staying
are, say, three) will move if there is no compensation, but will stay if they
expect compensation to be provided.
In sum, even if the government only compensates one-half of all losses
due to terrorism, there might still be a significant diminution of incentives to
choose the less-risky location or undertake other mitigation expenditures.
However, this is not the end of the story.
37. Of course, p is uncertain-you can never be sure if the government will compensate
forty percent or sixty percent of your loss, or more, or less. But this uncertainty should either
have no effect, or should serve to reduce the "effective" expected compensation rate if one is
risk averse.
38. Dubuque has a lower standard deviation of wealth as well as a higher mean than New
York. With no compensation, Dubuque clearly dominates (unless the firm is risk-loving, which
seems highly unlikely). Introducing a fifty percent compensation rule lowers the standard
deviation of wealth by an equal percentage amount in both New York and Dubuque. Hence,
unless firms are extremely risk averse, the relative variability induced by a move from no
compensation to fifty percent compensation should be of only second-order importance in the
choice of where to locate.
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Table 1: Incentive to Locate in New York and Dubuque
Under Various Insurance/Compensation Schemes
Assumptions
Asset Value 100
Prob. of Total loss, NYC 10%
Prob. of Total loss, Dubuque 6%
Policy Regime
"Free" Perfectly Imperfectly
No Gov't Priced Priced
Compensation Compensation Insurance' Insuranceb
"Replacement Rate, 4p", 0 50% 100% 100%
Expected Wealth, NYC 90 95 90 92
Std. Dev. of Wealth 30 15 0 0
Expected Wealth, Dubuque 94 97 94 92
Std. Dev. of Wealth 23.8 11.9 0 0
% Incr. in Expected Wealth
from Move to Dubuque 4.4 2.1 4.4 0
% Decr. in Std. Dev. of
Wealth From Move to
Dubuque 20.8 20.8 0 0
aPremiums are actuarially fair for each city.
bPremiums are actuarially fair for the country as a whole, but do not reflect
city-specific risks. Fifty percent of firms are located in New York and fifty
percent in Dubuque.
cShare of lost wealth that will be compensated by the government.
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B. Insurance and the Incentives for Mitigation
Suppose that the alternative to "free" governmental compensation (for
fifty percent of losses) is actuarially fair insurance for one hundred percent of
losses, with premiums based on city-specific risks. I call this "perfectly-priced
insurance," in the sense that the premiums perfectly reflect the risks in each
location. In this case, shown in column three, the premiums would be ten in
New York and six in Dubuque, and expected wealth would be the same as in
column one of table one (although of course the standard deviation of wealth
would be zero under full insurance). Hence, full insurance with appropriate
pricing of risks would maintain (almost) all of the inter-city incentives of a no-
insurance world.39 That is, the savings in insurance premiums from moving to
Dubuque under full insurance (with perfect pricing) would just equal the
savings in expected wealth from moving if there were no insurance at all.
What happens, however, if we are unable to set premiums at the city
level? Suppose we instead assume a single actuarially-fair premium is
charged for the country as a whole (and further that there are equal numbers of
firms in the two cities). Participation is mandatory, so there are no adverse
selection concerns. Thus, per table one, the average risk for the country as a
whole is eight percent, and every firm is charged a premium of eight percent,
regardless of location.
When there is full insurance and a single premium for all risks, regardless
of location, Dubuque would no longer have any advantage over New York at
all. By contrast, even free governmental compensation for fifty percent of loss
preserves at least some of Dubuque's appropriate advantage over New York.
This is all a long-winded way of saying something quite simple. When (p < 1,
so that the government does not replace one hundred percent of each dollar of
loss, the superiority of a premium-based insurance system depends critically
on how accurately the government can price risks.40 If Dubuque and New
York risks are priced the same-a single rate for the entire country-then the
free fifty percent compensation provides better incentives for mitigating the
harm of terrorist attacks than pay-in-advance insurance does. If each city's
risk is priced separately and accurately, then insurance provides the superior
39. Full insurance does slightly diminish Dubuque's advantage over New York, since full
insurance eliminates any variance in outcomes in either city, and Dubuque has a smaller
variance than New York in the absence of any insurance. Assuming firms are approximately
risk-neutral, this should be a small effect, however.
40. Hirshleifer acknowledges the importance of accurate pricing of risks, e.g., Hirschleifer,
supra note 1, at 153, 9 CONN. INS. L. J. at 17, but does not consider the possibility of less than
full compensation and the problems it poses for choosing the best insurance scheme.
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incentives for mitigation. Whether "free" partial compensation offers better
incentives for mitigation than "pay-in-advance insurance" then turns out to be
an empirical question, one that depends critically on how accurately the
government can price the risks in each location.'
C. Can the Government Price Accurately?
The obvious question then becomes, how accurately do we think the
government can price risks? We need to think about two kinds of inaccuracies
in pricing, which we can loosely term actuarial and political.
Hirshleifer acknowledges that there are all kinds of actuarial problems
with setting rates. It is very difficult to estimate the probability of a terrorist
attack, how it varies by city or region (or even by block), the likely damage it
will cause (by type of building), and so on. But he claims that even partial
steps to price insurance along these dimensions, even if inaccurate, will
inevitably be better than what amounts to free insurance.42 He is right-but
only if we assume that there will be full coverage in the absence of premium-
based insurance.
Moreover, there are further difficulties in pricing that Hirshleifer does not
explicitly acknowledge, difficulties that are essentially "political" in nature.
For many of the same reasons that the government would be under pressure to
provide free compensation to those who suffer property losses in the absence
41. Hirshleifer's comments suggest that he is aware of the problem, but since he assumes
that there will inevitably be full compensation (p = 1), he minimizes its importance.
If... [premiums are not set accurately enough], we are at least going in
the right direction, while simple compensation would be pushing us in the
wrong direction. We might... [set premiums with too large a differential
across risks], but in view of all the administrative and political pressures in
favor of the status quo, the danger of [encouraging too much mitigation]
seems quite slight."
Hirshleifer, supra note 1, at 151, 9 CoNN. INs. L.J. at 14. When comparing partial
compensation to inaccurately priced insurance, however, the incentive effects are not so clear.
42. See Hirshleifer, supra note 1, at 148, 9 CoNN. INS. L.J. at 9.
Setting the insurance rates will involve judgment and, therefore, the
differential rates will not have the ideal effects on incentives which could be
claimed for the true rates. Nevertheless, we believe that this is a case where
judgment would have to go very far astray to produce really perverse effects
on incentives, which is all we need to be afraid of. We shall not get
optimality, but we can expect improvement.
Id. "Nor would the element ofjudgment involved here be unique, since private insurance rates
for fire, theft, and other contingencies also are ordinarily based on informed judgment." Id. at
n. 11.
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of insurance, there will likely be intense political pressure to modify or
homogenize rates across risk categories. To see this, one need only imagine
the reaction of New York's Senators if the War Damages Insurance
Corporation were to set rates for New York at sixty-six percent higher than in
Dubuque. It is likely that there would be considerable public outcry at such
"discriminatory" behavior, and substantial political pressure to narrow the rate
differentials between the two cities. But this would have precisely the effect
of diluting the incentives for mitigation that the insurance program was
designed to protect.
Part of what makes Hirshleifer's proposal so attractive is that he adopts a
technocratic solution to what is in large part a political problem. But-
ingenious as it is-there is no reason to think that insurance pricing would be
any less subject to political influence than the decision to provide
compensation in the first place. Insurance does not provide a point of leverage
"outside the system," from which its vulnerability to political manipulation
can be overcome. Instead, the politicization of compensation would likely be
transformed into the politicization of rate-setting, with the same attenuating
effect on incentives to undertake harm-reducing activities that Hirshleifer so
cogently and presciently identified. At the very least, therefore, a successful
insurance program would have to be carefully designed so that it could operate
with minimal political interference, although this raises obvious concerns
about non-democratic discretionary decision-making.
D. Private Insurance?
I want to turn, finally, to a question that Hirshleifer does not address-
why do we need a governmental insurance program?43 Could we rely on
private anti-terrorism insurance to provide the appropriate signals about how
to mitigate the harms of terrorism and to spread these risks fairly and
effectively?
Although relying on private markets has some obvious appeal-at least to
an economist-the prospect does not seem promising in this situation, for two
reasons.
First, private markets may not be able to solve the Public Choice problem,
the fact that the political system will likely respond to any terrorist attack by
43. There has been a dramatic increase in the relative size of the insurance sector since
Hirshleifer wrote. Insurance carriers' share of GDP rose six-fold, from 0.3 percent in 1950 to
1.69 percent in 2000, according to the BEA National Income and Product Accounts. The
industry is now vastly more sophisticated, with much greater access to reinsurance markets and
other methods of spreading risks, which might explain why Hirshleifer did not consider private
insurance fifty years ago.
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offering substantial compensation to victims. One of the important reasons
Hirshleifer favors government-provided insurance is that it helps commit the
government not to provide blanket compensation, for reasons discussed
earlier.
Wouldn't a viable private market in anti-terrorism insurance forestall
some demands for governmental compensation, for the simple reason that
many victims' losses will be covered already? Perhaps so, but the story is
more complex than this because the demand for private insurance will be
greatly reduced if everyone knows the government will bail out those who are
injured. Why buy insurance when you can get (at least partial) compensation
for free from the government? To the extent that the problem lies precisely
with the government's response to the problem, private insurance is likely to
be ineffectual.
More generally, there are a whole set of additional reasons to be skeptical
about private provision of catastrophe insurance, of which anti-terrorism
insurance is a close cousin.44 First, catastrophic risks (hurricanes, earthquakes,
terrorist attacks) are not statistically independent as are, for example,
automobile accidents. Hence such risks are hard to diversify-away. The same
terrorist attack (or earthquake) will likely cause damage to a substantial
number of any company's insureds at the same time, so adding more insureds
does not protect against this risk in the same way that adding another
automobile policy does. Of course, there are means for laying-off parts of
such risks, including the use of reinsurance markets, but there are problems
here as well.
Second, the potential losses due to terrorism are large, highly uncertain,
and difficult to describe statistically. Who knows whether the probability of
another terrorist attack in the next year is one percent, five percent, or twenty-
five percent? Under these conditions, insurers might justifiably not want to be
on the hook for such large and highly variable damages. Finally, there are
important difficulties in accumulating the large pools of cash necessary to
provide insurance for substantial disasters, as Jaffe and Russell persuasively
argue.45
44. There is a large and growing literature on this subject. See generally THE FINANCING
OF CATASTROPHE RISK (Kenneth A. Froot, ed.) (1999). A provocative article on a theme similar
to Hirshleifer's is Harold Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Loss through Insurance, 12 J. RSK &
UNCERTAINTY 171, 171-87 (1996).
45. See Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets,
and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205 (1997), or more recently, Dwight M. Jaffee &
Thomas Russell, Extreme Events and the Market for Terrorist Insurance, available at
http://www.nber.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2002). A case for public provision of anti-
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CONCLUSION
War Damage Insurance anticipated many of the most interesting and
important developments in economics over the following fifty years, and it did
so in an accessible and cogent fashion. As if that were not enough, the topic
of insuring against substantial attacks on the U.S. is once again of tremendous
current importance. While it may not have the last word on these issues, I
cannot imagine a better place to begin thinking about the economic issues
involved than with Hirshleifer's article. It deserves to be acknowledged as a
classic contribution to economic analysis.
terrorism insurance, based on the externality that results when my precautions shift the risk
of terrorism to someone else, is made by Darius Lakdawalla and George Zanjani, Insurance,
Self-Protection and the Economics of Terrorism, National Bureau of Economics Research,
Working Paper 9215 (Sept. 2002) (on file with the author).
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